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Extending the potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits is
one of the most frequently adopted policy instruments to ease economic hardships
of job losers. For instance, the United States extended UI benefits from 26 weeks
up to 99 weeks during the Great Recession. Many other UI systems do not let UI
generosity vary over the business cycle but rather across groups with different labor
market conditions. In particular, many countries grant more generous UI benefits
to older job losers. The present paper studies the impact of extended UI benefits on
employment and retirement behavior and explores the social welfare implications of
a UI system that grants more generous benefits to older workers.
The social desirability of UI benefit extensions is highly controversial. Theoreti-
cal arguments show that optimal UI faces a trade-off between moral hazard effects,
captured by labor supply/job search responses, and consumption smoothing ben-
efits, captured by relaxed liquidity constraints (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2008).1 We
argue that, in the context of older workers, it is important to broaden this basic
logic by considering the costs and benefits of all welfare benefits that protect older
workers in case of a job loss. In many countries, early retirement schemes allow
older unemployed workers to withdraw from the work force by using extended UI
benefits in combination with other public transfers, in particular disability insurance
(DI) benefits, but also specific early retirement schemes, and/or retirement benefits.
This is what we call program complementarity. Alternatively, more generous UI
benefits may induce workers to reduce take-up of other welfare programs. This is
what we mean by program substitution. While program complementarity imposes
an additional burden on government budgets, the impact of program substitution is
unclear.2
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we study the causal impact of
extended UI benefits on (i) the incidence of early retirement and (ii) the particular
pathways through which workers exit the labor market. We focus on Austria. Under
1While a large literature has documented the adverse consequences of more generous benefits
for unemployment exit rates (see, e.g., Meyer, 1990; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine,
2000), only few empirical papers have examined the consumption smoothing benefits of UI benefits
(Gruber, 1997; Browning and Crossley, 2001).
2When DI take-up is associated with stigma costs or a disutility due to medical
checks/bureaucratic hassles, a worker may decide to stay unemployed even when UI benefits are
smaller than DI benefits. This saves money to the government. In contrast, DI benefits often pro-
vide a constant stream of income while alternative early retirement pathways imply varying income
levels over time. Liquidity constrained workers may thus prefer DI benefits even if lifetime income
is lower. When, starting from such a situation, UI becomes more generous, some worker will switch
to UI benefits. This increases government expenditures.
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the Austrian system of the late 1980s and early 1990s, workers aged 50+ were eligible
for 1 year of regular UI benefits. Moreover, worker aged 55+ had relaxed access to DI
benefits. To empirically identify the causal impact of extended UI benefits for older
workers, we exploit a policy intervention that changed early retirement incentives
dramatically: the regional extended benefits program (REBP). This program was in
place between June 1988 and July 1993 and granted regular UI benefits for up to 4
years to workers aged 50+ living in certain regions of the country. Variation in the
maximum duration of UI benefits across regions and age groups allows us to identify
the causal impact of extended UI benefits on the incidence of early retirement and
the particular pathways by which workers leave the labor market. Since the REBP
was only in effect for a limited period of time, we can estimate both the effects
of introducing and abolishing extended UI benefits using a difference-in-differences
approach.
We find that extended UI benefits have a strong effect on the incidence of early
retirement, defined as permanent exit from the labor force before the retirement
age. The probability that a job loser aged 50-54 permanently withdraws from the
labor market increases by 15.6 percentage points when the worker is eligible to the
REBP. Among job losers aged 55-57, the incidence of early retirement increases by
14.5 percentage for those eligible to the REBP.3 Extended UI benefits also affect the
pathways into early retirement. For workers aged 50-54, program complementarity
– exit from the labor force by combining extended UI with DI and/or retirement
benefits – is quantitatively important. The 15.6 percentage point increase in early
retirement is associated with a 12 percentage point increase in exits through the
DI program. For workers aged 55-57 both program complementarity and program
substitution – higher take-up of UI but lower take-up of DI – are at work. The 14.5
percentage point increase in early retirement is associated with a 24 percentage point
increase in using extended UI benefits to bridge the gap until retirement benefits
and a 9.5 percentage reduction in claiming of DI benefits.
The second aim of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of extended
UI benefits for older workers. We follow the sufficient statistics approach proposed by
Chetty (2006a) and use information on received transfer payments (UI, DI, and other
3As we explain in more detail in the next section, retirement incentives are different before and
after age 55 due to relaxed access to DI benefits. Moreover, retirement incentives between REBP
regions and non-REBP regions disappear after age 57. This is why our analysis looks at age groups
50-54 and 55-57.
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transfers) associated with REBP eligibility.4 Using this model, we incorporate both
program complementarity and program substitution effects into the social welfare
calculation. We find that, given the Austrian early retirement rules of the late
1980s and early 1990s, the extension of UI benefits was welfare-improving only if
the degree of risk aversion exceeds 2.25. The value of risk aversion remains disputed
and a growing body of literature suggests that risk preferences are context-specific
(Chetty and Szeidl (2007), Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011), Einav et al.
(2012)). Studies that use labor supply elasticities to estimate risk aversion come
closest to our setting. These studies typically find values of risk aversion below 1
(Chetty, 2006b). We conclude that extended UI through the REBP was most likely
a suboptimal policy.
We believe that there are two main reasons why our analysis is of general interest.
First, policy makers in many countries have implemented early retirement schemes
and these schemes turned out to be very costly. Many countries are debating (or
have already implemented) reforms that reduce the generosity of these schemes with
the goal of raising employment rates among older workers. Austria is an interesting
case study because early retirement schemes were heavily used to mitigate labor
market problems of older workers over the past decades. While the Austrian early
retirement system created particularly large incentives, the system is qualitatively
similar to those of many other countries. Early retirement schemes often feature
relaxed DI-eligibility criteria for older workers, including the United States (Chen
and van der Klaauw, 2008), and the maximum duration of UI benefits is extended
above certain age thresholds, as in Germany, (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender,
2012).5 This suggests that our results illustrate mechanisms of policies that are at
work (and under debate) in many other countries.
Second, it is often argued that labor supply responses along the extensive margin
are important to reconcile large labor supply elasticities in macroeconomic calibra-
tions with small elasticities often found in micro studies focusing on hours responses
(see e.g., Rogerson and Wallenius, 2013). By looking at how the Austrian REBP
4Recent applications of the sufficient statistic approach for optimal UI design include Shimer
and Werning (2007), Chetty (2008), Kroft (2008), Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2014), Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2011), Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2012), and Landais (2014). See the
article by Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for a detailed discussion of this literature.
5Countries other than Austria and the United States that relax access to DI for older workers
include Australia, Denmark, Finland (until 2003), and Sweden (until 1997). Countries other than
Austria and Germany that extend UI above certain age thresholds include France, Finland, Greece,
Italy, and Portugal.
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affects early retirement, we shed light on the extensive margin of lifetime labor sup-
ply. We show how this margin is affected by the interaction of various programs and
how lower work incentives generated by one program may either be enhanced by
complementary incentives of other programs or dampened by inducing individuals
to substitute between programs. Depending on the relative strengths of substitu-
tion and complementarity effects, labor supply elasticities may be underestimated
or overestimated.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies how multiple social
insurance programs affect workers’ labor supply decisions. It differs from the larger
literature that studies the isolated effect of a single program on labor supply and/or
early retirement. Autor and Duggan (2003) examine the interaction between unem-
ployment and disability insurance in the United States. They find that less strict
medical screening, declining demand for less skilled workers, and an increase in the
earnings replacement rate are the most plausible candidates to explain the rise in
DI take-up. Autor et al. (2014) provide U.S. evidence for program complementarity:
recipients of Veterans Affairs’ Disability Compensation are significantly more likely
to qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. Using administrative
data from the Netherlands, Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014) provide empiri-
cal evidence that more restrictive DI benefits increase enrollment into other forms
of social insurance. Petrongolo (2009) studies the impact of the UK JSA reform of
1996 that imposed stricter job search requirements and additional administrative
hurdles for UI benefit claimants. She finds that the associated fall in UI benefit
recipients was associated with higher take-up of DI benefits. Furthermore, rather
than increasing the transition to regular jobs, the reform temporarily decreased the
outflow to employment.6
A recent literature studies the impact of UI and/or DI on labor supply and re-
tirement of older workers.7 Karlstro¨m, Palme, and Svensson (2008) find that stricter
eligibility criteria for DI benefits in Sweden increased take-up of unemployment and
sickness benefits, but did not increase employment rates. Similarly, the results of
6Spillover effects among social insurance programs have been examined in other contexts by
Garrett and Glied (2000), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (2004),
Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007), Roelofs and van Vuuren (2011), and Staubli and Zweimu¨ller
(2013).
7Related to these studies is the work on the extension of UI benefits for older workers by
Winter-Ebmer (2003), Kyyra¨ and Wilke (2007), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a, 2004b) and Lalive
(2008). These papers analyze the UI program in isolation and ignore potential interactions with
other social insurance programs.
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Staubli (2011) suggests that increasing the minimum age of relaxed DI access in
Austria led to a significant decline in DI enrollment but only to a slight increase
in employment. Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen (2008) document a strong decrease in early
retirement after a reform in Finland that increased the eligibility age for extended
UI benefits from 53 to 55. Lammers, Bloemen, and Hochguertel (2013) show that
increased search requirements for older unemployed in the Netherlands increased not
only employment rates but also DI take-up. Our paper extends this literature by
investigating how extended UI benefits for older workers affect retirement behavior
through program complementarity and program substitution. Moreover, it uses the
estimated behavioral elasticities to explore the welfare implications of extended UI
benefits for older unemployed workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the institutional
background of Austria. In particular, we discuss the various pathways to early re-
tirement in the Austrian system and the rules associated with the regional extended
benefit program. In Section II, we describe our data and provide preliminary de-
scriptive evidence of the impact of the REBP. Section III lays out our identification
strategy. In Section IV, we discuss our main results. In Section V, we develop a the-
oretical early retirement framework to address the welfare consequences of extending
the unemployment benefits duration. Section VI summarizes the main results and
draws policy conclusions.
I Institutional Background
Austria’s Public Pension System. Our study focuses on workers experiencing
unemployment during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, it is useful to start
with a brief overview of the Austrian pension and UI system during that time pe-
riod. Regular UI benefits are a function of the wage on the last job and replace
approximately 55 percent of the prior net wage, subject to a minimum and max-
imum. On top of regular UI benefits, family allowances are paid. The UI system
plays an important role for the labor market exit of older workers because these
workers are subject to more generous UI benefit rules. First, while job losers below
age 50 receive at most 39 weeks of regular UI benefits, job losers above age 50 can
claim benefits for up to 52 weeks provided they have paid UI contributions for at
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least 9 years in the last 15 years.8 Job losers who exhaust the regular UI benefits
can apply for “unemployment assistance” (UA). These means-tested transfers last
for an indefinite period and are about 70 percent of regular UI benefits.
Second, unemployed men (women) aged 59 (54) or older can claim “special
income support”, provided that they have contributed to the UI program for at
least 15 out of the previous 25 years. The aim of these transfers is to support
unemployed individuals until they become eligible for an old-age pension at age 60
for men and age 55 for women. Special income support is equivalent to an UI spell
in legal terms, but with 25 percent higher benefits. Benefits are paid for a period
of 12 months, except for workers in the mining sector who can claim special income
support for up to 5 years. Special income support can be combined with regular UI
and UA benefits. Thus, the UI system essentially allows male (female) workers to
withdraw from the labor market at age 58 (53) and bridge the gap until an old-age
pension via regular UI benefits followed by special income support.
A second retirement pathway is via the DI program, which grants relaxed access
to a DI pension from age 55 onwards. This resembles the disability screening process
in the United States, where standards are relaxed discontinuously at age 55 (Chen
and van der Klaauw, 2008). More specifically, Austrian applicants below age 55
are eligible for a DI pension if a medically determinable impairment reduces the
ability to work by more than 50 percent relative to that of a healthy person with
comparable education in any occupation that the individual is able to carry out.
Applicants above age 55 are classified as disabled if their work capacity is lower
than 50 percent compared to a healthy person with comparable education in the
same occupation. Due to this relaxation in eligibility criteria, disability enrollment
rises significantly at age 55.9 The DI application review process is likely to rely
also on informal criteria to evaluate an applicant’s medical impairments and ability
to work. Such informal criteria may be particularly relevant for applicants with
difficult-to-verify medical conditions, such as back pain and depression. However,
8More specifically, individuals who have worked 1 year or more in the last 2 years receive benefits
for 20 weeks, while those with at least 3 years of employment in the past 5 years receive benefits
for 30 weeks. Furthermore, workers over the age of 40 who worked at least six years in the past
ten years are eligible for 39 weeks of benefits. Before August 1989, the maximum duration of UI
benefits was 30 weeks for all individuals. See Lalive, Van Ours, and Zweimu¨ller (2006) for a detailed
description of the policy change and its impact on the unemployment duration of job losers.
9In 1996, the age limit for relaxed access to disability pensions was raised to age 57; for an
evaluation of this policy change, see Staubli (2011). All individuals that are considered in the
empirical analysis below, were subject to pre-1996 disability pension rules.
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our data do not allow us to check whether and to what extend informal criteria are
relevant.
DI and old-age pensions are calculated in the same way, except for a “special
increment” granted to DI claimants below age 55. The benefit amount is determined
by the “assessment basis” and the “pension coefficient”. The assessment basis corre-
sponds to the average earnings of the best 15 years after applying an earnings cap in
each year. The pension coefficient corresponds to the percentage of the assessment
basis that is replaced by the pension. The pension coefficient increases with the
number of contribution years (periods of employment, unemployment, sick leave, or
maternity leave) up to a maximum of 80 percent. DI and old-age pensions replace
on average between 70 and 80 percent of the last net wage, respectively, and each
additional contribution year increases the replacement rate by roughly 2 percentage
points. While the pension increases when the worker claims at a later age, the in-
crease is far from actuarially fair (Hofer and Koman (2006)). Moreover, pensions
are earnings-tested: individuals lose a fraction or all of their pension when labor
earnings exceed an exempt amount (about 300 Euros per month). Unsurprisingly,
very few individuals return to the labor force once they claim a DI or an old-age
pension. Finally, UI benefits depend only on earnings in the previous job, while DI
and old-age pensions are based on the entire work history. Thus, an individual’s
replacement rate of a DI or an old-age pension can be very different from the re-
placement rate of UI benefits. As a consequence, job losers with otherwise similar
characteristics may have quite different incentives to exit the labor market via a
particular pathway.
Table 1 illustrates the size of the different programs in terms of average expen-
ditures and enrollment among 50-59 year old men between 1985 and 1995. For
workers in this age group, the DI program is substantially larger in size compared
to the UI system both in terms of enrollment and spending. Within the UI system,
regular UI benefits are the largest program followed by special income support and
UA benefits.
Table 1
The Regional Extended Benefit Program and Retirement Pathways.
To preclude Soviet appropriation after World War II, Austria nationalized its
iron-, steel-, and oil industries. After the mid-1970s, the state-run company
O¨sterreichische Industrie AG, in charge of administrating the nationalized firms,
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faced shrinking markets due to the international oil and steel crisis, low productivity,
and outdated smokestack industries. Before 1986, financial losses were covered by
governmental subsidies, but in 1986 a speculation scandal triggered the abolishment
of this protectionist policy. A new management was appointed that implemented a
strict restructuring plan. This process caused layoffs and downsizing of production
plants, particularly in the steel industry.
To protect older workers against adverse labor market conditions in the steel in-
dustry, the Austrian government implemented the Regional Extended Benefit Pro-
gram (REBP) in June 1988. The program extended the potential unemployment
duration from 52 weeks to 209 weeks for the subgroup of workers who satisfied each
of the following criteria at the beginning of their unemployment spell: (i) age 50 or
older, (ii) continuous work history (15 years of employment in the past 25 years),
(iii) location of residence in one of the eligible regions for at least 6 months prior to
unemployment entry, and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell after June 1988
or spell in progress in June 1988.
The REBP was initially implemented in 28 out of about 100 labor market dis-
tricts. The minister for social affairs, a member of the ruling social democratic party
(SPO¨), was in charge of selecting the regions that were included in the program.
Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004b) show that eligible regions were characterized by a
relatively high share of employment in the steel sector (around 17 percent in REBP
regions versus roughly 5 percent in non-REBP regions).10 However, they found no
differences in the unemployment rate or the percent of long-term unemployed be-
tween treated and non-treated regions in the years 1986-88, prior to the start of the
REBP.
In November 1991, a reform of the REBP was enacted which became effective in
January 1992. The reform left all claims in progress unaffected. For new entrants,
the reform abolished the benefit extension in 6 of the originally 28 regions. It also
tightened eligibility criteria, as individuals had to be not only residents, but also
previously employed in a REBP region. We label the set of treated regions that
were excluded after the reform as “TR1s”. In the remaining 22 regions the REBP
was in effect until August 1993, when it was abolished entirely. The abolishment
left all claims in progress unaffected; only new claims were no longer eligible for
the benefit extension. We label the regions that kept eligibility after the reform
10The ultimate decision on set of regions that became eligible to the program was heavily criti-
cized by opposition parties and media as being biased towards the clientele of the ruling parties.
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as “TR2s”. Regions never entitled to the REBP are labeled as “CRs”. Figure 1
plots the distribution of REBP across the 2,361 communities in Austria. The figure
illustrates that TRs (communities with blue or dark-blue shading) are all located
on a contiguous area in the Eastern and Central parts of Austria.
Figure 1
The introduction of the REBP dramatically changed retirement incentives for
older unemployed men, as illustrated in Figure 2. Without the REBP, older un-
employed men could withdraw from the labor force at age 58 by bridging the gap
until an old-age pension via regular UI benefits followed by special income support.
We call this retirement pathway early retirement without DI. With the introduction
of the REBP eligible unemployed men could effectively withdraw through the UI
system at age 55. Thus, we expect that during the REBP period there will be an
increase in the percent of 55-57 year old unemployed who retire early without DI.
This is an example of a program complementarity effect: extending UI benefits in-
creases permanent exits from the labor force due to the ability to combine extended
UI benefits with other public transfer programs in the future.
Due to the relaxed DI-eligibility criteria, job losers above age 55 have a high
incentive to apply and perhaps ultimately receive a DI pension. We call this re-
tirement pathway early retirement with DI. It is very likely that some 55-57 year
old unemployed men who would have retired early with DI in the absence of the
REBP may instead have decided to retire early without DI during the REBP. This
is an example of a program substitution effect: the more generous UI benefits reduce
contemporaneous take-up of another program.
Figure 2 also suggests that the REBP led to important changes in the early
retirement incentives for unemployed men below age 55. More specifically, without
the REBP unemployed men below age 55 could retire early with DI at age 54 by
claiming UI benefits for 12 months followed by a DI pension at age 55. With the
introduction of the REBP this option was already available to unemployed men aged
51 and older. Thus, we expect that the REBP leads to a program complementarity
effect among 51-53 year old unemployed men. Some unemployed men who would
have returned to employment without the REBP may have instead used extended UI
benefits during the REBP as a bridge to a DI pension. Theory predicts a program
complementarity effect among 51-53 year old job losers, but in the empirical analysis
below we extend the age range to ages 50-54. This choice of age group is guided
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by the data because we observe that the REBP also has an impact on the early
retirement behavior of 50 and 54 year old unemployed men. Yet, as we will show,
the estimates for the age group 51-53 are similar albeit slightly larger.11
Figure 2
II Data and Descriptive Evidence
Data Sources. We combine register data from two different sources. The Aus-
trian Social Security Database (ASSD) provides detailed longitudinal information
on the labor market and earnings histories of the universe of private-sector workers
in Austria (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009). The second source is the Austrian unemploy-
ment register, which contains information on the place of residence (community)
and relevant socio-economic characteristics of registered unemployed workers.
We consider all job separations of male workers aged 50-57 that resulted in a UI
claim between 1985 and 1995.12 These spells are then followed up until the end of
2012. We focus on men because women are already eligible for an old age pension
at age 55 (as opposed to age 60 for men), which is also the age for relaxed access to
a DI pension. Women are only affected by the REBP if unemployment entry occurs
in the age range 50-52. (While most of our results will refer to men, we will also
briefly present results on women.)
In our observation period 223,069 unemployment spells were started by men in
the age group 50-57. From these, we drop 14,147 unemployed men who entered un-
employment from a job in the steel sector because they may face worse labor market
prospects in TRs due to the steel crisis.13 We also exclude 43,553 unemployed men
with less than 15 employment years in the past 25 years as they are not eligible
for the REBP. Focusing on workers with long experience also guarantees that the
11In principle, unemployed men below age 55 could also consider retiring early without DI.
However, this option is likely to be less attractive compared to early retirement with DI because
50-54 year old job losers need to rely on UA benefits to bridge the time until they become eligible
for an old-age pension. In contrast, 55-57 year old job losers can bridge the time by relying on
regular UI only. We see in the data that some 50-54 year old job losers do use UA benefits to retire
early without DI. Most of these individuals are close to age 55 at the beginning of the UI spell and
therefore need to rely on UA benefits only for a short period.
12For part of the empirical analysis we also include male job losers aged 58-59 and extend the
sample to UI spells between 1980 to 1998.
13The steel crisis may have affected job prospects of unemployed men in TRs whose last job
was not in the steel sector through spillover effects. In the empirical analysis we present results for
several robustness checks that address this concern.
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job seekers in our sample will be eligible for special income support at age 59 and
for an old-age pension at age 60. Because the Austrian labor market is character-
ized by large seasonal employment fluctuations (Del Bono and Weber, 2008), we
exclude 82,201 men whose last two jobs were with the same employer. These job
seekers are likely on temporary layoff and do not face the trade-off between work
and early retirement. We also drop 1,531 unemployed men from the mining sector
as this sector has more generous rules for special income support. The final sample
comprises 81,637 unemployment spells (58,343 spells of workers aged 50-54 when
entering unemployment; and 23,294 spells of workers aged 55-57). Note that indi-
viduals can appear multiple times in our sample: we observe two or more job losses
for 25 percent of the individuals in the sample.
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics on exit states after the unemploy-
ment spell by region of residence before (1/1985–5/1988), during (6/1988–7/1993),
and after the REBP (7/1993–12/1995). “Early retirement” is defined as (i) claiming
a DI or an old-age pension at the end of the UI spell and (ii) not having earnings
above the exempt amount (roughly 300 Euros) in any month after the start of the
UI spell.14 Early retirement is decomposed into “early retirement with DI” which
includes only exits to DI pensions and “early retirement without DI” which includes
only exits to old-age pensions. Before the REBP the probability of early retirement
is 5 percentage points higher in TRs than in CRs because job losers in TRs are
more likely to retire early with DI. During the REBP the difference in the probabil-
ity of early retirement increases to 28.4 percentage points. This increase is primarily
driven by an increase in the share of job losers in TRs who claim either a DI or an
old-age pension at unemployment exit. After the abolishment of the REBP, the dif-
ference in the incidence of early retirement between TRs and CRs decreases again to
the pre-REBP level, suggesting that the program had no long-lasting effects on the
labor supply of unemployed men. Notice also that there is an increase in the inci-
dence of early retirement in all regions over the entire observation period. This most
likely reflects a general deterioration in labor market conditions for older workers
and/or an increased propensity to retire early.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that, before and after the REBP, job losers in TRs are
somewhat less educated and are more likely to have worked in blue-collar occupa-
14Only 6.6 percent of job losers who exit into early retirement have earnings below the exempt
amount at some point after the start date of the UI spell. An UI spell is defined as censored if there
is no employment, disability pension or old-age pension spell between UI entry and the last year in
our data (2012). Censoring in the data occurs because some job losers die during the UI spell.
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tions and the manufacturing industry than job losers in CRs. However, the overall
background characteristics are similar. During the REBP there are more apparent
differences in background characteristics. More specifically, job losers in TRs are
more likely to have worked in the machinery industry, have earned higher wages, and
have longer tenure compared to job losers in CRs. This pattern is consistent with
a previous study by Winter-Ebmer (2003) who argues that firms used the REBP
to get rid of high-tenured and expensive older workers. Table 2 also illustrates that
during the REBP there is a sizeable increase in unemployment inflow in TRs rela-
tive to CRs. The ratio of the number of unemployment spells in TRs versus CRs is
approximately 1 to 4 before and after the REBP, which roughly reflects differences
in the size of the labor force in TRs compared to CRs. This ratio increases to some-
what less than 1 to 3 during the REBP. In Section IV, we will examine the impact
of the REBP on unemployment inflow in more detail.
Table 2
Descriptive Evidence. We start with a graphical assessment of the impact of
extended UI benefits on early retirement behavior. Figure 3 plots the fraction of
transitions from unemployment for three exit destinations: (i) any early retirement
(Panel A), (ii) early retirement with DI (Panel B), and (iii) early retirement with-
out DI (Panel C). The graphs report transitions by age at UI entry and region of
residence before, during, and after the REBP. Panel A shows that both before and
after the REBP transition rates into early retirement are quite similar in TRs and
CRs for all entry ages. The transition rate peaks at age 58, which is the earliest
age allowing for a permanent exit from the labor market through the UI system in
the absence of the REBP (see Figure 2). During the REBP, the transition rate into
early retirement between ages 50-57 is substantially higher in TRs, indicating that
a significant portion of unemployed men uses the extended UI benefits to perma-
nently exit the labor force. This is in line with evidence for the age group 58-59
where there are only small regional differences. Workers at these ages do no need to
have access to the REBP to retire early but can use regular UI benefits and special
income support.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that the incidence of early retirement with DI is
slightly higher in TRs before and after the REBP, perhaps reflecting some underlying
regional differences in the characteristics of unemployed men. For example, Table
2 shows that job losers in TRs are more likely to work in blue-collar occupations
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and tend to be less educated. Both factors are associated with a higher disability
risk. During the REBP period, there is a striking increase in early retirement with
DI among job losers in TRs starting their UI spell between ages 50-54, suggesting
that extended UI benefits serve as a bridge to a DI pension for some unemployed
men in this age group. This is evidence for program complementarity.15 For the age
group 55-57 in TRs, there is evidence for program substitution, as there is a non-
negligible decline in early retirement with DI. Put differently, the REBP induces
some unemployed men who would have claimed a DI pension in the absence of the
REBP to stay unemployed until they become eligible for an old-age pension. This
substitution away from DI pensions is also reflected in Panel C of Figure 3, which
shows that the incidence of early retirement without DI (i.e., direct transitions from
UI into old-age pensions) is significantly higher between ages 55-57 in TRs during
the REBP period (program complementarity).
Figure 3
As we will discuss in more detail in the next section, our empirical approach to
evaluate the impact of the REBP relies primarily on the assumption that UI exits
would have followed similar trends in TRs and CRs in the absence of the REBP.
To shed light on this assumption, it is useful to compare trends in transitions into
different exit states in TRs and CRs over time. Such a comparison is particularly
important in our context, given that the REBP was implemented in regions with a
strong steel sector that were particularly affected by the steel crisis. Importantly,
adverse labor market conditions in the steel industry may have had local spillover
effects to other industries violating the assumption underlying our empirical ap-
proach.
Figure 4 illustrates how transitions into early retirement, early retirement with
DI, and early retirement without DI for the age groups 50-54 (Panel A) and 55-57
(Panel B) develop over time by region. Here, we pool all treated regions, but Figures
B.1 and B.2 in the Online Appendix B show the effects separately for TR1s and
TR2s. The first vertical line denotes the date when the REBP was implemented.
15Notice that for a 50 year old the REBP-induced extension in the maximum duration of UI
benefits is too short to bridge the gap until age 55. This individual can follow two strategies: (1)
claim a DI pension under the strict eligibility rules at the end of the regular UI spell at age 54
or (2) claim a DI pension at age 55 under the relaxed eligibility rules and rely on one year of UA
benefits to bridge the time between age 54 and age 55. We find that during the REBP 71% of 50
year old men in treated regions who retire early via the DI program follow strategy (2) and 29%
follow strategy (1).
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The second and the third vertical line denote the dates when the REBP was abol-
ished in TR1s and TR2s, respectively. For both age groups transition rates into
different exit states are very similar in TRs and CRs before the second half of 1988,
suggesting that the steel crisis had little impact on other industries in TRs. In the
second half of 1988, the period when the REBP started, transitions rates start to di-
verge. For the age group 50-54 there is a program complementarity effect; transition
rates into early retirement, early retirement with DI, and (to a smaller extent) early
retirement without DI increase in TRs relative to CRs. For the age group 55-57
there is a program substitution and a program complementarity effect; transitions
into early retirement with DI decline and transitions into early retirement without
DI increase disproportionately so that overall transitions into early retirement in-
crease. After the second half of 1993, when the program was abolished, the effects
of the REBP are reversed and regional differences in transition rates are relatively
small again.
Figure 4
III Identification Strategy
To estimate the causal effect of extended UI benefits on early retirement, we
exploit the quasi-experimental variation in the maximum duration of UI benefits
across Austrian regions generated by the REBP. Our identification strategy relies
on a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The first difference is over time,
because the program was in effect only from June 1988 to July 1993. Since the
REBP was only in effect for a limited period of time, we are able to test whether
the policy effects of introducing and abolishing extended UI benefits are symmetric.
The second difference is across geographic areas; only older job seekers living in one
of the 28 selected regions were eligible for the benefit extension.
The DiD comparison is implemented by estimating regressions of the following
type:
yit = α+ β(A0t × TRi) + γ(A1t × TRi) + λt + ηi + X′itδ + εit, (1)
where i denotes individual and t is the start date of the unemployment spell. The
outcome variable yit is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual withdraws from
the labor force after leaving unemployment through the early-retirement pathway
of interest and 0 otherwise. We consider three early-retirement pathways: (i) early
14
retirement, (ii) early retirement with DI, and (iii) early retirement without DI, where
the latter two pathways are subsets of the first one. The variable TR is an indicator
taking the value 1 if an individual lives in a treated region; A0 is an indicator taking
the value 1 if the UI spell started after the REBP was introduced (June 1988 or
later); and A1 is an indicator taking the value 1 if the UI spell started after the
REBP was abolished (January 1992 or later in TR1s and August 1993 or later in
TR2s). We include labor market region fixed effects (ηi) to control for permanent
region-specific differences, dummies for year-month of unemployment entry (λt) to
control for macroeconomic conditions, and a set of background characteristics (Xit)
to control for observable differences that might confound the analysis.16 Remember
that UI spells in progress at the time the REBP was implemented were also eligible
for the extended UI benefits. This rule implies that UI spells that started less than
30 weeks (November 1987) before the REBP were potentially eligible. To capture
the impact of the REBP on UI spells in progress, we include an indicator for UI
spells in TRs that started between November 1987 and May 1988.
The coefficients of interest are β and γ. These coefficients capture all variation in
the outcome variable specific to older job losers in TRs (relative to CRs) in the years
when the REBP was in effect (relative to before the REBP; β) and in the years after
which the REBP was abolished (relative to during the REBP; γ). Clearly, if the
introduction and abolishment of the REBP have symmetric effects, we have β = −γ.
We test this hypothesis when presenting the main results and show that the policy
effects are symmetric. Therefore, for all subsequent robustness and placebo tests
we impose symmetry, which increases the statistical power. More specifically, we
replace (A0t×TRi) and (A1t×TRi) with a single interaction term (Dt×TRi) where
D is an indicator taking the value 1 for UI spells that started during the REBP.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for the age groups 50-54 and 55-57 because
the impact of the REBP on early retirement behavior is likely to be very different for
both groups. In particular, job losers in the age group 50-54 may use the REBP to
bridge the gap until age 55 when conditions for access to a DI pension are relaxed.
Job losers in the age group 55-57 can directly apply for a DI pension under the
relaxed eligibility criteria or, if eligible, they may use the REBP instead to bridge
the gap until age 60 when they become eligible for an old-age pension.
16Background characteristics are log previous wage, marital status, education, dummies for weeks
of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status, work experience in last 13 years, years of
service in last job, sick leave history, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummy
for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction.
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The central identifying assumption is that trends of the outcome variable in CRs
are informative on the counterfactual in the absence of the REBP. This assumption
implies that there are no omitted time-varying and region-specific effects correlated
with the program. There are some concerns about the validity of this assumption,
given that the motivation behind this policy was to provide a better protection to
older unemployed in regions with a strong steel sector. Hence, it is possible that
the steel crisis may have had spillover effects to other industries in TRs. Such
idiosyncratic shocks to TRs would violate the identifying assumption and lead to
an upward bias in the estimates. We will run several robustness checks to test for
this possibility.
Another threat to the validity of our identification strategy is the possibility that
the more generous unemployment rules changed the composition of unemployment
inflow in TRs, which may lead to a selection bias. Table 2 provides some evidence
that selection may occur: during the REBP period unemployment inflow increases
in TRs relative to CRs and job losers in TRs are more likely to have worked in the
machinery industry in their last job, have earned higher wages, and have more tenure
than job losers in CRs. To ascertain that selective inflow does not affect our results,
we identify a subsample of unemployed men whose layoff was likely exogenous and
examine the impact of the REBP for this subsample of job losers.
IV The Effect of the REBP on Early Retirement
Main Results. Our main results are summarized in Table 3, with columns 1
through 3 providing the estimates of equation (1) for the age group 50-54 and
the next three columns displaying the analogous results for the age group 55-57.
The dependent variable is an indicator, which is equal to 1 if an individual exits
unemployment through the particular state in question (any early retirement; early
retirement with DI; early retirement without DI) and 0 otherwise.
Table 3
Consistent with the graphical evidence from Figure 3, the first row indicates
that the REBP increased the probability of early retirement among 50-54 year old
male job losers by 15.6 percentage points, or 62% of the baseline early retirement
probability in the pre-REBP period. This increase is mostly driven by additional
early retirements with DI (i.e., transitions from UI via DI to old-age pensions) which
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increased by 12 percentage points (column 2) and – to a lesser extent – by additional
early retirements without DI (i.e., direct transitions from UI to old-age pensions) of
3.6 percentage points (column 3).17 This is strong evidence for program complemen-
tarity: 50-54 years old unemployed men used extended UI benefits provided by the
REBP to bridge the time until becoming eligible for a DI or an old-age pension. The
third row shows that the effects on transitions from unemployment to the various
exit states are completely reversed after the program is abolished. Compared to the
introduction effect, the abolishment effect on the incidence of early retirement with
(without) DI benefits is somewhat smaller (higher) in absolute value. However, as
reported in the fifth row, F -tests for the null hypothesis that β = −γ are insignifi-
cant at conventional levels of statistical significance, showing that the effects of the
REBP introduction and abolishment are symmetric.
A main reason why extended UI benefits lead to complementarity with DI is
relaxed DI access after age 55. Hence, early retirement with DI by 50-54 year old
job losers in TRs should mainly be driven by an increased inflow into DI after age
55. To explore the impact of the REBP on the age at DI entry, we estimated two
versions of equation (1) imposing the symmetry assumption β = −γ . In the first
one, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the 50-54 year old job
loser enters DI before age 55; in the second version, the dependent variable indicates
DI entry after age 55. Consistent with these incentives, the REBP had little impact
on DI claiming before age 55, while there is a sizeable increase in DI claiming after
age 55. The probability of DI entry after age 55 is 11.7 percentage points higher
for job losers eligible to the REBP. (Results are shown in Table A.1 of the Online
Appendix A.)
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3 present estimates of equation (1) for the age group
55-57. The first row shows that the introduction of the REBP led to an increase
in transitions from unemployment into early retirement of 14.5 percentage points
among the treated individuals aged 55-57. In this age group, there is clear evidence
for both program substitution and program complementarity: in the years during
the program there is a 9.5 percentage point decline in the probability to claim a DI
pension (program substitution) and a 24 percentage point increase in the probability
17We also explore the effects for 51-53 year old job losers separately, since, as discussed above,
the REBP incentives are particularly strong for this age group. As expected, we find slightly larger
point estimates for this age group. More specifically, the REBP introduction led to a 17.5 percentage
point increase in any early retirement, a 14.9 percentage point increase in early retirement with DI,
and a 2.6 percentage point increase in early retirement without DI.
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to claim an old-age pension (program complementarity). Similar to the age group
50-54, the effects are completely reversed after the abolishment of the program, as
shown in the third row.
The strong substitution effect may be surprising given that UI benefits are
smaller than DI benefits for most individuals. For example, among 55-57 year
job losers UI benefits are smaller than DI benefits 83% of the time. However, this
comparison ignores the fact that each additional year spent on UI benefits, UA bene-
fits, or special income support counts as contribution year, increasing future old-age
benefits by around 2%. Comparing the entire stream of benefits up to age 78 (the
average life-expectancy of men during that time period), assuming an interest rate
of 2.5%, reveals that for the age group 55-57 the pathway early retirement with DI
is 52% of the time more generous than the pathway early retirement without DI.
This number changes significantly during the REBP: early retirement with DI is
only 21% of the time more generous than early retirement without DI, illustrating
that using extended UI benefits as a bridge to an old-age pension is appealing.
Results by Age. To further explore the impact of the introduction and abol-
ishment of the REBP, we estimate equation (1) for each age in the interval 45-59
separately. Figure 5 illustrates the results with dots on the solid black line showing
the estimates of the interactions (A0t× TRi) and the dots on the gray line showing
the estimates for the interactions (A1t×TRi). The 95% confidence interval is shown
by dashed lines. As shown in the first graph, the probability to retire early does
not change for workers younger than 50, but for workers between 50 and 57 the
increase is significant during the REBP period, suggesting that there are sizeable
program complementarity effects. The impact is fully reversed after the program
is abolished, as illustrated by the gray line. At ages 58 and 59, when the REBP
does not provide differential incentives, we do not see significant differences between
eligible and non-eligible workers.
The black line in the second graph of Figure 5 shows that during the REBP there
is a significant increase in early retirement with DI for UI entrants aged 50-53, with
transitions to DI up to 15 percentage points higher among job losers eligible to the
REBP. The point estimate for age 54 is insignificant because 54 year old job losers in
CRs can also bridge the time until age 55 with the regular duration of UI benefits of
one year. As the gray line shows, excess DI entry in the age group 50-53 is reversed
after the abolishment of the REBP. For unemployed workers in the age group 55-57,
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estimated coefficients for early retirement with DI are negative, providing evidence
for a program substitution effect. More specifically, with the introduction of the
REBP, early retirement without DI became financially relatively more attractive
than early retirement with DI. The estimated coefficient during the REBP is large
and amounts up to 10 percentage points or more.
The third graph of Figure 5 shows the change in the incidence of early retirement
without DI. This option is mainly attractive for workers aged 55-57 who could use the
REBP to bridge the time until they become eligible for an old-age pension. For these
ages, there is more than a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of early
retirement without DI during the REBP period. There is also a significant increase
in transitions into old-age pensions for 54 (and a slight increase for 53) year old job
losers, even though these individuals needed to rely for some time on means-tested
UA benefits to bridge the time until they could claim an old-age pension. At ages
younger than 53, job losers eligible to the REBP do not exhibit a higher probability
of early retirement without DI. The gray line in the third subfigure highlights that
the REBP effects are reversed after the abolishment of the program.18
Figure 5
Strength of Incentives. We also test whether the size of the estimated REBP
effects varies with the strength of incentives (with results shown in Table A.2 of the
Online Appendix A.) We estimate equation (1), assuming symmetric policy effects,
and interact (Dt × TRi) with an indicator for whether a job loser’s predicted DI
benefits are above the median in the distribution of predicted DI benefits. We find
that REBP responses are stronger for individuals who face stronger incentives. Job
losers aged 50-54 with predicted DI benefits above the median are substantially more
likely to retire with DI than those with DI benefits below the median. Moreover,
the probability of retirement without DI is unaffected by the level of DI benefits.
For job losers aged 55-57 with predicted DI benefits above the median we see
a roughly 5 percentage point smaller REBP reduction on early retirement with
DI (less program substitution) and also a 5 percentage points smaller increase in
early retirement without DI (less program complementarity) than for those with
predicted DI benefits below the median. A second exercise explores the idea that
18For 59 year old job losers, there is a significant decrease (increase) in early retirement without
DI (early retirement with DI) after the REBP is abolished. These significant estimates are based
on a very small sample, as shown by the wide confidence interval.
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REBP incentives should be stronger for healthy workers compared to less healthy
job losers who are likely to exit the labor market even without the REBP. We see
indeed weaker REBP effects for less healthy job losers aged 55-57. However, we do
not find such a pattern for job losers aged 50-54.
Placebo. In the next step, we run a number of placebo regressions, assuming that
the effects of the REBP introduction and abolishment are symmetric (Table 4).
Recall that the criteria for REBP eligibility include (i) a minimum of 15 years of
work experience (within the last 25 years) and (ii) age 50 or older. Moreover, the
REBP did make a difference only during ages 50-57, while workers above age 57
did not face differential incentives. To check the validity of our empirical strategy,
we ran placebo regressions for workers aged 50-57 with less than 15 years of work
experience (rows 1 and 2); for workers aged 45-49 (row 3); and for workers aged 58-
59 (row 4). Results reported in Table 4 show a consistent picture: living in a REBP
region does not per se increase the incidence of early retirement. All point estimates
are both small and statistically not different from zero (only for workers aged 55-
57 with low experience we see more early retirement without DI, but the effect is
relatively small). In sum, the placebo regressions strongly support the claim that
REBP incentive effects drive observed early retirement patterns for workers aged
50-57.
Table 4
Women. Up to now, all results referred to male job losers. The reason for the
focus on males is that many more males than females were affected by the REBP.
This is due to old-age pension rules (see Section 2 above). The rules in place during
the 1980s and 1990s allowed women to draw old-age pensions already at age 55
(provided they had contributed enough years to the public pension system). With
minimum pension age at 55, the REBP created incentives for females job losers at
ages 50-52, while females at ages 53-54 did not need the REBP to bridge the time
to the eligibility age of an old-age pension (with one year on regular UI and another
year on special income support).
In Table 5, we explore the REBP effects for women. The left panel of the
table presents estimates of (Dt × TRi) for ages 50-52, while the right panel reports
estimates for ages 53-54. In line with incentives, the REBP generates a very strong
increase in early retirement for female job losers aged 50-52 (column 1), while the
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effect is nil for UI entrants aged 53-54 (column 4). The effect for the age group 50-
52 is quantitatively very large with early retirement increasing by 28.6 percentage
points. This is mainly due to program complementarity as early retirement without
DI increases by 34.5 percentage points. There is also program substitution, a 6
percentage points lower probability that a female job loser takes up DI benefits
after UI.
It is interesting to compare the effects for females aged 50-52 to those of males
aged 55-57 (see Table 3, right panel) because these two groups face very similar
REBP incentives and because both groups had a similar probability to retire early –
slightly above 50% – before the REBP. It turns out that the impact of the REBP on
early retirement is about twice as large for females aged 50-52 than for males aged 55-
57 which is driven by substantially larger program complementarity. Interestingly,
the program substitution effect is substantially smaller for females aged 50-52 than
for males aged 55-57. The reason for this latter effect is that job losers aged 55-57
have immediate access to relaxed DI, while job losers aged 50-52 do not. We conclude
that female job losers react much more strongly to the REBP than male job losers.
This pattern is consistent with existing evidence that women exhibit higher labor
supply elasticities than men; a result often explained by females’ higher productivity
in the household and higher opportunity costs of market work.
Table 5
Other Labor Supply Measures. Our main results focus on the extensive margin
of lifetime labor supply, i.e. the incidence of early retirement and its channels
(with and without DI take-up). However, we also explore how other outcomes of
male job losers are affected by the REBP (results are shown in Table A.3 of the
Online Appendix A assuming symmetric policy effects). We find that the REBP
decreased take-up of means-tested UA benefits, particularly among job losers aged
55-57. Moreover, restricting the sample to the first UI spell per individual to avoid
double-counting, we find that the REBP reduced the number of years worked until
age 65 by 0.723 years for ages 50-54 and by 0.363 years for ages 55-57, reduced
cumulative future earnings until age 65 by 15,728 Euros for ages 50-54 and by 8,570
Euros for ages 55-57, and delayed the claiming age of a (DI or old-age) pension by
0.293 years for ages 50-54 and by 0.59 years for ages 55-57.
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Differential Trends. The key assumption of our DiD identification strategy is
that trends in transitions from unemployment into different exit states would be
the same in TRs and CRs in the absence of the REBP. This assumption rules out
differential trends that existed already prior to the REBP as well as idiosyncratic
shocks to TRs and CRs.
The availability of several years of data before and after the REBP allows us
to investigate to what extent trends differ across regions. More specifically, we
generalize equation (2) by replacing (Dt × TRi) with a set of treatment times year
interaction terms for the period 1980 to 1998 (baseline year is 1987):
yit = α+
1998∑
j=1980\1987
pij(djt × TRi) + λt + ηi + X′itδ + εit, (2)
where djt is a dummy that equals 1 if the unemployment spell starts in year j
and 0 otherwise. Here, we set TR equal to 0 in TR1s after the reform of the REBP in
December 1991. Figure 6 plots the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms for
age groups 50-54 and 55-57 (the 95% confidence interval is shown by dashed lines).
The patterns are similar if we estimate equation (2) for TR1s and TR2s separately,
as illustrated in Figures B.3 and B.4 in the Online Appendix B. In all six panels
the estimated coefficients fluctuate around 0 before the introduction of the REBP
(June 1988) and after its complete abolishment (August 1993), providing evidence
that the empirical strategy is not simply picking up long-run trends in differences
between TRs and CRs.
As shown in the top left and bottom left panels of Figure 6, the coefficients
for early retirement turn significantly positive during the REBP. For the age group
50-54 the effect first increases and then drops sharply after the REBP was abolished
in TR1s (January 1992). For the age group 55-57 the effect declines over time. The
increase in early retirement in the age group 50-54 is driven by a large increase
in early retirement with DI (top middle panel) and, to a lesser extent, by early
retirement without DI (top right panel). The bottom middle and the bottom right
panel indicate that for the age group 55-57 there is a decline in early retirement
with DI and a large increase in transitions in early retirement without DI.
Figure 6
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Robustness. Table 6 presents the DiD coefficients of equation (1) (using the
symmetry assumption β = −γ) for alternative samples of male job losers aged 50-54
(Panel A) and 55-57 (Panel B). The first row in each panel displays the results of
our baseline sample for comparison. Our sample includes multiple observations for
individuals with multiple UI spells over the observation period (1985-1995) and in
a first robustness test we only include the first UI spell per individual. It turns out
that disregarding multiple spells leads to almost identical REBP effects for both age
groups. The third row in each panel shows the DiD estimate when we include steel
workers. Our baseline sample excluded steel workers to rule out policy endogeneity
(as the program was mainly designed to mitigate hardships of workers from the steel
industry). However, adding steel workers to the sample leads to almost identical
or only slightly higher coefficients. In the fourth row, we add recalls (job losers
whose last two jobs were with the same employer). Adding recalls to the sample
does indeed reduce the DiD coefficients substantially. This is not really surprising
as previously recalled workers are likely to return to their previous employer (rather
than retire early), both in treated and control regions. As a result, the REBP effects
are driven by non-recalls and much weaker for recalls.
Table 6
One potentially important confounding factor of our analysis are unobserved
differences in labor market conditions between treated and control regions. To
check the robustness of our results, we compare subsamples among treated and
control regions that have arguably more similar labor market conditions. In row 5
of each panel in Table 6 we only include job losers living within 30 minutes driving
distance to the border between treated and control regions. A comparison of eligible
and non-eligible workers in this reduced sample is unlikely driven by labor market
conditions which should be quite similar within this tightly defined geographical
area. It turns out that the point estimates are only slightly smaller, suggesting that
our main results are unlikely biased by unobserved labor demand factors. In row 6
of Table 6 we replicate our findings for job losers from the tradable-goods sector,
excluding the sector “manufacturing of iron and steel products” (due to the close
link of this sector to the steel industry). The idea is that labor demand prospects
in these sectors are less dependent on local economic conditions and inter-sectoral
linkages. Hence, the estimates should be less aﬄicted by sectoral spillover effects
and by spillover effects from treated to non-treated individuals via changes in local
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labor demand. It turns out that the estimates are very similar to the baseline
estimates. Another concern is that the linear specification in equation (1) may be
too restrictive to capture the influence of covariates. To allow for more flexibility,
we use a matching DiD approach following Blundell et al. (2004). As row 7 of each
panel shows, this approach yields estimates that are very similar to the baseline
estimates. Overall, the robustness checks of Table 6 show that our baseline effects
are very robust.
Unemployment Inflow. We now examine the impact of the REBP on unemploy-
ment inflow. This is potentially important because the REBP might have induced
responses by firms and workers resulting in a higher unemployment inflow. We
follow a two-stage approach to ascertain that selective inflow does not affect our re-
sults. In the first stage, we estimate the impact of the REBP on UI inflow rates for
different subsamples of the population using the same specification as in equation
(1). This allows us to identify a subsample of unemployed men whose layoff was
likely exogenous. In the second stage, we examine the impact of the REBP for this
subsample of job losers.
We start by constructing a sample of male workers over the period 1985 to 1995
who are 50-57 years old and who are employed at the beginning of a quarter. The
sample comprises 3,707,735 person-quarter observations of 291,095 men.19 Figure 7
plots the difference in the quarterly unemployment inflow in percent of employment
between TRs and CRs.20 For both age groups there are no particular regional
differences in inflow rates before the first quarter of 1988. For the age group 55-57
the difference in UI inflow rates begins to increase when the REBP was introduced,
while regional UI inflow rates are unchanged for the age group 50-54. However,
for both age groups the difference in inflow rates exhibits a large peak in the last
quarter of 1991, which corresponds to the period immediately before the REBP was
reformed. This reform was announced in November 1991 and became effective in
January 1992. Similarly, the difference in inflow rates also increases in the three
quarters before the complete abolishment of the REBP, which was announced June
19Consistent with the sample restrictions for the unemployment sample, we focus on non-steel
workers with a continuous employment history (at least 15 years in the past 25 years) who are not
recalled by their previous employer.
20Figures B.5 and B.6 in the Online Appendix B report differences in the quarterly unemploy-
ment inflow rate separately for TR1s and TR2s. In TR1s, there are strong seasonal fluctuations in
the unemployment inflow rate that are not driven by recalls. The seasonality is not visible in the
pooled Figure 7 because the size of the labor force in TR1s is much smaller compared to TR2s.
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1993 and became effective August 1993. In the after-REBP period inflow rates are
slightly lower in TRs compared to CRs, particularly for the age group 55-57. This
pattern suggests that there is a re-timing effect: firms who have to lay off workers
and workers who want to quit are more likely to do so when unemployment benefits
are still generous.
Figure 7
To quantify the impact of the REBP on UI inflow rates, Table 7 presents OLS
estimates of equation (1) for different subgroups. In each case the outcome variable
is a dummy equal to 1 if a worker starts a UI benefit claim in a given quarter and 0
otherwise. Result for the age group 50-54 (column 1) show a positive (though not
statistically significant) point estimate after the REBP was introduced and a signif-
icantly negative reduction after the REBP was abolished. For workers aged 55-57
the effects are higher and significant both after introduction and after abolishment.
Since UI inflow in TRs started to increase in the last quarter of 1991, columns 2
and 5 report estimates if we exclude UI spells that started in October 1991 or after.
In this case, the inflow effect disappears for the age group 50-54 (column 2) but
remains significant for the age group 55-57 (column 5). However, as columns 3 and
6 illustrate, the inflow effect becomes insignificant for both age groups, if we addi-
tionally exclude workers above the 90th percentile in the tenure or wage distribution
or who previously worked in the machinery industry. This finding is consistent with
Table 2 which shows that excess UI inflow in TRs is concentrated in the machinery
industry and among high-wage earners with high tenure. Based on these results,
it is reasonable to assume that prior to October 1991 layoffs of workers below the
90th percentile in the tenure and wage distribution whose last job was not in the
machinery industry are exogenous and not determined by the REBP.
Table 7
Panel A of Table 8 reports estimates of equation (1) for job losers who started
a UI benefit claim before October 1991, while panel B shows analogous estimates
if we additionally exclude job losers in TRs whose last job was in the machinery
industry or whose tenure or wage in the last job is above the 90th percentile in the
tenure or wage distribution. The coefficients in columns 1-3 of panel A indicate
that the introduction of the REBP had quantitatively similar effects for 50-54 year
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old job losers who started an unemployment spell before October 1991 as for the
full sample. The estimates for early retirement and early retirement with DI are
somewhat smaller if we also exclude high-tenure and high-wage individuals and job
losers from the machinery industry (columns 1-3 of panel B), but they are still
sizeable in magnitude and statistically significant. As columns 4-6 of panel A show,
the point estimates of the REBP introduction for job losers between ages 55-57 who
enter the UI program before October 1991 are very similar to the estimates for the
full sample presented in Table 3. Excluding also high-wage and high-tenure workers
and workers from the machinery industry from the sample has very little effect on
the estimates (columns 4-6 of panel B). Overall, these findings suggest that our
estimates are not strongly affected by selective unemployment inflow.
Table 8
V Fiscal Costs and Welfare Implications
This section discusses the fiscal costs of the REBP for taxpayers and the associ-
ated welfare implications of REBP. Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006a) discuss socially
optimal insurance as a trade-off between moral hazard costs and the benefits of
better insurance. In the basic Baily-Chetty framework, moral hazard costs are cap-
tured by the elasticity of benefit duration with respect to the level of UI benefits. In
our context, the fiscal costs consist of all costs to taxpayers that are associated with
program-complementarity and program-substitution responses. Hence, we proceed
by directly estimating the fiscal costs of extended UI benefits. We then use these
estimates as sufficient statistics to address the welfare implications of the REBP.
In the Online Appendix C we propose a simple model which makes explicit the
relationship between the estimated fiscal costs and the behavioral responses due to
program substitution and program complementarity.
Estimating the Fiscal Costs of the REBP. Our empirical analysis so far has
studied the behavioral responses of the REBP on early retirement and its pathways.
We now look at the costs to taxpayers associated with these responses. To estimate
overall costs, we need to adopt a forward-looking perspective. Consider a group
of 50-54 year old job losers eligible to the REBP. According to the main results of
Table 3 a larger fraction of workers in this group will take up early retirement with
DI. Additional fiscal costs do not only arise because eligible workers claim regular
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UI benefits longer, but also because they spend more time on DI, and less time in
employment. This implies higher UI and DI payments and lower tax revenues. The
REBP may also reduce UA payments (which would have to be paid to the long-
term unemployed in the absence of the REBP), and lower old-age benefits (because
earlier retirement is associated with lower old-age pensions).
In Table 9 we re-estimate equation (1) using the various components of fiscal
costs as a dependent variable (measured in 2014 Euros). Fiscal costs are calculated
on an individual basis, given the job loser’s observed earnings history (which deter-
mines the benefits in the various programs) and the chosen retirement path (which
determines the present value associated with each benefit flow). The coefficient of
column (A) estimates additional costs to the UI program of 9,227 Euro per worker
aged 50-54 eligible to the REBP. The total costs are reduced due to lower payments
for UA (column B), but somewhat enhanced by additional costs to the DI program
(C). Furthermore, the government needs to spend less on old age pensions (D) but
has substantial foregone tax revenues (E). The estimated fiscal costs amount to
13,109 Euros per worker aged 50-54 eligible to the REBP.21
Panel B of Table 9 reports the corresponding results for job losers aged 55-57.
Since many eligible workers stay on UI until they reach the regular retirement age,
there is a huge increase in regular UI benefits. Also in this age group UA payments
are lower. Moreover, there are substantially less expenditures on DI though the gov-
ernment spends more money on old-age pensions (D) due to higher old-age benefits
(time in UI increases the old-age pension, while time on DI does not). Furthermore,
the government loses tax revenue resulting from reduced work incentives. In sum,
the estimated fiscal costs amount to 9,465 Euros per worker aged 55-57 eligible to
the REBP.
Table 9
21The variables UI benefits, UA benefits, DI benefits, and payroll taxes measure the total amount
of regular UI benefits (including special income support) received, UA benefits received, DI benefits
received, and payroll taxes paid until age 65 because after age 65 almost all individuals receive a
public pension. For example, for somebody who never claims UA benefits until age 65 we set
UA benefits to zero. The variable old-age benefits measures the total amount of old-age benefits
received until age 78 (the average life-expectancy of men during that time period). We assume a
real interest rate of 2.5% to discount future payment streams. In the spirit of the model presented
in the Online Appendix C, we also estimate the financial implications of the REBP in terms of
costs per pathway, i.e. return-to-work, early retirement with DI, and early retirement without DI.
The results of this specification are shown in Table 9 of the Online Appendix A.
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Was the REBP Too Generous? We can now address the question whether the
REBP was socially optimal in the context of the familiar Baily-Chetty framework. In
this approach, the government sets UI parameters to maximize social welfare subject
to the constraint that the costs associated with the program have to be financed by
taxes paid by employed workers. In our context this means that the government
has to take into account that expenditures on UI, DI, and old-age pensions have to
be financed by taxes τ paid by the working population.22Assuming that individuals
do not save, the formula for optimal UI by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006a) can be
written as
u′(b)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) =
CT
CM − 1, (3)
where CT denotes the increase in total net expenditures due to a marginal increase in
UI benefits, while CM captures the additional costs due to the mechanical effect only
(i.e., the hypothetical costs without behavioral responses). The l.h.s. of formula (3)
captures the marginal benefit of consumption smoothing while the r.h.s. quantifies
the costs associated with distorted labor supply and early retirement choices.
We use the estimates in Table 9 to calculate the increase in total net expenditures
CT . More specifically, CT corresponds to the weighted average of the increase in
total net expenditures within each age group, using relative sample size as weights
(0.72 for age group 50-54 and 0.28 for age group 55-57). This yields an increase
in total net expenditures of CT = 12, 089 Euros per 50+ worker eligible for the
REBP. To calculate the increase in mechanical costs CM , we take the labor supply
of the control group as a counterfactual for the treatment group in the absence
of behavioral responses and calculate the difference in net expenditures with and
without the REBP.23 This procedure yields mechanical costs of 2,073 Euros per
unemployed worker in the age group 50-54 and 786 Euros per unemployed worker in
the age group 55-57, with a weighted average of 1,713 Euros. The r.h.s. of formula
(3) then equals CT /CM − 1 = 12, 089/1, 713− 1 = 6.06.
To derive an estimate of the insurance value provided by the REBP, we need
22In our model, we take into account that only old but not young individuals are eligible to the
program. This is captured by the simplifying assumption that there is a period where individuals
are young, do pay taxes, but do not face an unemployment risk.
23More specifically, we first calculate the number of years unemployed men in CRs spend in
UA until age 65 and then multiply this number with 30% of annual UI benefits (future benefits
are discounted with an interest rate of 2.5%). The idea behind this calculation is that with the
introduction of the REBP UA benefits, which amounts to 70% of UI benefits, are replaced with
regular UI benefits.
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to make an assumption on the utility function in equation (3). Assuming CRRA
utility u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ), the l.h.s. of equation (3) becomes RR−γ − 1 where
γ is the relative risk aversion and RR = b/(w − τ) denotes the net replacement
rate of UI benefits in terms of after tax income.24 Notice that RR captures the
replacement rate over a five-year interval, implying RR = 0.42 without the REBP.25
The preceding calibration allows us to calculate a hypothetical risk aversion level
γh that satisfies the local optimality condition
γh = − ln(CT /CM )/ lnRR = − ln(7.06)/ ln 0.42 = 2.25. (4)
Despite its importance the value of relative risk aversion remains disputed. In
particular, previous studies find that risk aversion is context-specific and varies with
the scale of the risk (Chetty and Szeidl (2007), Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum
(2011), Einav et al. (2012)). Studies that use labor supply elasticities to estimate
risk aversion come closest to our setting. Using 33 sets of estimates of wage and
income elasticities, Chetty (2006b) finds that the mean implied risk aversion is 0.71
with a range of 0.15 to 1.78. Since our estimate of risk aversion is well above this
range (γ = 2.25), we conclude that providing increased UI generosity through the
REBP was a suboptimal policy.
Further Welfare Implications. Our result that the REBP was a suboptimal
policy holds under specific assumptions. It is useful to ask whether these assump-
tions indeed hold. First, our calculation has assumed that workers do not save.
When workers can save and have liquid assets, they are at least partly insured
against reductions in consumption during unemployment, as consumption during
unemployment cu > b and consumption during employment ce < w − τ . In that
case, the l.h.s. of equation (3) would become lower. In other words, the implied
hypothetical risk aversion, γh, needed to justify the costs of increased UI generosity,
would be even larger than 2.25. In sum, allowing for savings and self-insurance
would reinforce the conclusion that the REBP was suboptimal.
24With CRRA utility, the marginal utility gains from UI benefits and after-tax income are u′(b) =
b−γ and u′(w − τ) = (w − τ)−γ , respectively. Hence, the l.h.s. of (3) becomes b−γ/(w − τ)−γ − 1
or RR−γ − 1.
25Our calibration intends to represent Austrian UI rules around 1990 with 1/5 UI benefits and
4/5 UA benefits without the REBP and 4/5 UI benefits and 1/5 UA benefits with the REBP. We
assume a net replacement rate of UI benefits of 55% and a net replacement rate of UA benefits of
38.5%, or 70% of UI benefits. Hence, the five-year net replacement rate of UI benefits without the
REBP is RR = 1/4 ∗ 0.55 + 4/5 ∗ 0.385 = 0.42.
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Second, our calculation has assumed that the REBP affects the early retirement
margin and its particular pathways but does not have any further effects on labor
market outcomes. This assumption is problematic because we have documented in
Section IV that the REBP increased the unemployment inflow significantly. This
could be the result of firm decisions (firms find it easier to get rid of older workers)
or by worker decisions (workers have an incentive to exploit more generous UI to
withdraw early from the labor market). Both responses by firms and responses by
workers increase the total expenditures of the program. With a higher r.h.s of equa-
tion, γh needs to increase in order to justify the higher costs.26 Hence, accounting
for inflow effects reinforces the conclusion that the REBP was suboptimal.
A third caveat of the above welfare considerations concerns general equilibrium
effects. Notice that the direction of macro responses is not a priori clear. More gen-
erous UI could further increase unemployment through wage externalities (workers
have better outside opportunities) or mitigate it through positive search externalities
(non-eligible workers find jobs more easily).27 Using the REBP, Lalive, Landais, and
Zweimu¨ller (2015) find indeed shorter unemployment durations among non-eligible
workers in treated regions (compared to similar workers in control regions) and in-
terpret this finding as evidence for search externalities.28 Moreover, they argue that
comparing eligible workers in treated regions to similar workers in control regions
is informative on the macro effect of extended UI. To the extent that macro effects
are captured by comparisons of local labor markets with different UI generosity, our
welfare analysis incorporates general equilibrium effects. In that case, our conclusion
that REBP was suboptimal remains unchanged.
Based on our analysis of program complementarity and program substitution, we
think that labor market policies for older workers should address two different issues.
First, it is very important to tightly integrate the UI benefit rules with DI benefit
26In the Online Appendix D we allow for responses along the job separation margin and show
that our risk aversion estimate is very likely to be a lower bound.
27Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2014) show that UI should be more generous when there are
positive search externalities (provided that labor market tightness is below its efficient level and the
Hosios (1990) condition is violated). Empirical evidence shows that the difference between micro
and macro elasticity is positive and countercyclical, hence Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2014)
conclude that optimal UI should also be countercyclical.
28In contrast, our placebo regressions of Table 4 show that non-eligible workers in treated regions
do not have a lower incidence of early retirement than comparable workers in control regions. This
suggests that the REBP affects non-eligible workers who remain in the labor force but does not
affect non-eligible workers who drop out of the labor force. This latter result is consistent with the
argument that search externalities are driving the behavior of non-eligible workers.
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and pension rules to provide better work incentives and to avoid expensive program
complementarity effects (Hairault et al., 2012). Moreover, UI and DI benefit rules
should be aligned to old-age pension rules in pension reforms. This is of particular
importance because the explicit goal of pension reforms is to increase the effective
retirement age of older workers. Second, policies should think more carefully about
the incentive for firms to hire older workers (and also make sure that employers
do not have incentives to fire older workers). A policy mix that combines work
incentives in UI and DI benefit rules with policies that encourages firms to retain
(and train) older workers and discourages firms to fire older workers (through firing
taxes) is needed to keep the labor force participation among older workers high
(Che´ron, Hairault, and Langot, 2011). To the extent that this policy mix keeps
unemployment inflow and durations low, moral hazard costs will be low and UI
benefits can provide older workers with a sufficiently high level of insurance against
the risk of unemployment.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, we study how extending the maximum duration of UI benefits
targeted to older workers affect early retirement and social welfare. Extended dura-
tions of UI benefits for older workers are an important element of early retirement
schemes in many countries. To identify the impact of the maximum duration of
UI benefits on the incidence of early retirement, we exploit the Austrian regional
extended benefits program (REBP) that was in place between June 1988 and July
1993. This program constitutes a large policy intervention, extending regular UI
benefits to 4 years for workers aged 50+ living in certain regions, while workers
in non-REBP regions were eligible to 1 year of regular UI benefits. Our identifi-
cation strategy is based on a difference-in-differences comparison of individuals in
REBP-regions to individuals in non-REBP regions, before, during, and after the
program.
We find that the REBP had a very strong effect on the incidence of early retire-
ment. The probability that a job loser aged 50-54 (55-57) retires early is 15.6 (14.5)
percentage points higher among individuals eligible to the REBP. For job losers
aged 50-54, this effect is mainly driven by early retirement with DI: a combination
of take-up of extended UI benefits with higher future take-up of DI benefits (pro-
gram complementarity). Of the 15.6 percentage point increase in early retirement,
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12 percentage points are due to an increase in UI take-up followed by DI take-up in
the future. For job losers aged 55-57, there is a strong increase in early retirement
without DI, while the incidence of early retirement with DI decreases. The former
result is due to program complementarity: permanent exit from the labor force by
combining extended UI benefits with retirement benefits; the latter result is due to
program substitution: take-up of extended UI instead of DI. The 14.5 percentage
point increase in early retirement consists of a 24 point increase in the percentage
staying on UI before claiming an old-age pension; and a 9.5 point reduction in the
percentage claiming a DI pension.
Our empirical estimates help to explore whether extending UI benefits for older
workers was a socially optimal policy. We estimate the costs to the government
associated with extended UI benefits and derive a formula in the spirit of Baily
(1978) and Chetty (2006a). This formula captures both program complementarity
and program substitution effects. We find that while program substitution saves
some money to the government, the bulk of changes in government expenditure
is driven by program complementarity effects. Using our empirical estimates, we
conclude that extending UI benefits for the elderly is welfare-improving only if the
degree of risk aversion exceeds 2.25. This estimate is higher than most previous
estimates that use labor supply elasticities to identify risk aversion (Chetty, 2006b).
We argue that unemployment inflow and general equilibrium effects, which are not
taken into account in our formula, are unlikely to overturn this result. We therefore
conclude that the REBP was a suboptimal policy.
From a policy perspective, our study suggests that policy reforms aiming at in-
creasing the effective retirement age should take particular care to carefully consider
the entire set of welfare programs that impact the (early) retirement decision. A
policy mix that allows for simultaneous and coordinated reforms in UI and DI pro-
grams to tackle the unemployment-disability margin, together with complementary
measures that induce firms to hire and retain older workers is the most promising
route for policy reforms.
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Table 1: Average annual expenditures on and enrollment in different programs
among 50-59 year old men between 1985 and 1995
UI system DI program
UI UA Special income
benefits benefits support
Enrollment (in %) 4.6 1.4 2.9 15.6
Spending (in million Euros) 119.9 34.4 119.3 458.6
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data. All Euro amounts are in 2014 Euros.
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Table 2: Sample statistics in treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs) before, during,
and after REBP
Before REBP During REBP After REBP
CRs TRs CRs TRs CRs TRs
A. Exit state (%)
Employment 70.7 65.4 60.6 31.7 54.8 48.2
Early retirement 27.6 32.6 37.4 65.8 43.2 49.5
Early retirement with DI 20.5 24.6 27.5 41.8 30.9 38.2
Early retirement without DI 7.1 8.0 9.9 24.0 12.2 11.3
Censored 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.3
B. Background characteristics
Age at UI entry (years) 53.6 53.5 53.3 53.6 53.6 53.5
Sick days 101.6 92.2 107.9 87.2 93.7 97.2
Married (%) 72.4 74.6 75.1 80.7 75.6 76.9
Daily wage (Euros) 61.1 59.3 68.3 74.2 74.3 73.7
Blue collar (%) 82.6 85.8 74.4 75.2 67.5 72.1
Experience (years) 11.5 11.7 11.2 11.8 11.3 11.4
Tenure (years) 3.7 4.4 4.4 6.4 5.5 5.7
Education
Low (%) 53.6 57.2 49.4 48.4 42.7 45.6
Medium (%) 33.1 32.4 39.3 42.6 43.9 44.4
High (%) 5.6 3.1 9.2 7.5 12.0 9.5
Industry
Agriculture (%) 7.1 10.0 6.2 6.6 6.2 5.8
Wholesale and retail trade (%) 13.6 13.0 18.0 14.0 19.8 17.2
Manufacturing (%) 11.1 15.6 11.7 19.0 11.5 16.3
Machinery (%) 5.4 7.4 6.6 22.8 7.0 12.0
Construction (%) 44.2 41.7 34.3 24.4 30.3 30.5
Services (%) 18.7 12.3 23.2 13.2 25.0 18.2
No. of observations 16,107 4,034 27,964 9,764 19,250 4,518
Notes: “Before” denotes unemployment spells starting in January 1985 to May 1988. “During” denotes
unemployment spells starting in June 1988 to July 1993 (December 1991 in TR1s). “After” denotes
unemployment spells starting in August 1993 (January 1992 in TR1s) to December 1995. “Sick days” is
the sum of days spent in sick leave prior to unemployment entry, “experience” denotes work experience in
the last 13 years, and “tenure” refers to tenure in last job. Daily wage is adjusted for inflation. Different
education categories do not sum to one as education is missing in some cases.
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Table 3: Effect on unemployment exit of men in the age groups 50-54 and 55-57
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Early Early Early Early Early
retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement
with DI without DI with DI without DI
REBP introduced 0.156*** 0.120*** 0.036** 0.145*** -0.095*** 0.240***
(A0 × TR) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034)
REBP abolished -0.145*** -0.094*** -0.051*** -0.125*** 0.104*** -0.229***
(A1 × TR) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024)
p-value of F -test 0.444 0.081 0.209 0.368 0.787 0.734
Mean TRs pre-REBP 0.252 0.217 0.035 0.505 0.315 0.190
R2 0.200 0.172 0.091 0.255 0.137 0.321
No. of observations 58,343 58,343 58,343 23,294 23,294 23,294
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies
for education, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work
experience in last 13 years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to
UI entry, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment
entry, dummy for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market
districts. F-test tests null hypothesis that the coefficients on REBP introduced and REBP abolished are
jointly equal to zero. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
Table 4: Effect on unemployment exit of men, placebo tests
Early Early Early No. of
retirement retirement retirement observations
with DI without DI
< 15 employment years, age 50-54 0.011 0.001 0.009 18,393
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
< 15 employment years, age 55-57 0.033 -0.010 0.044** 5,856
(0.042) (0.044) (0.021)
Age group 45-49 0.004 0.005 -0.000 74,530
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Age group 58-59 0.001 -0.022 0.023 13,706
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017)
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies
for education, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work
experience in last 13 years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to
UI entry, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment
entry, dummy for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market
districts. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 5: Effect on unemployment exit of women in the age groups 50-52 and 53-54
Age 50-52 Age 53-54
Early Early Early Early Early Early
retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement
with DI without DI with DI without DI
During REBP 0.286*** -0.060*** 0.346*** 0.003 -0.011 0.014
(D × TR) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014)
Mean TRs pre-REBP 0.514 0.073 0.441 0.932 0.018 0.914
R2 0.265 0.072 0.302 0.203 0.077 0.233
No. of observations 24,049 24,049 24,049 17,854 17,854 17,854
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies
for education, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work
experience in last 13 years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to
UI entry, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment
entry, dummy for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market
districts. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 6: Effect on unemployment exit of men, robustness checks
Early Early Early No. of
retirement retirement retirement observations
with DI without DI
A. Age 50-54
Main results 0.149*** 0.103*** 0.046*** 58,343
(0.014) (0.018) (0.011)
Only one spell 0.157*** 0.116*** 0.041*** 42,899
(0.014) (0.019) (0.011)
With steel workers 0.163*** 0.102*** 0.061*** 67,778
(0.019) (0.021) (0.013)
With recalls 0.093*** 0.068*** 0.025*** 115,896
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
30 min driving distance to border 0.132*** 0.075*** 0.056*** 14,393
(0.021) (0.024) (0.013)
Only tradable goods 0.156*** 0.114*** 0.042*** 27,630
(0.019) (0.022) (0.011)
Propensity score matching 0.148*** 0.107*** 0.041*** 58,343
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
B. Age 55-57
Main results 0.132*** -0.101*** 0.233*** 23,294
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024)
Only one spell 0.137*** -0.110*** 0.247*** 15,175
(0.018) (0.024) (0.032)
With steel workers 0.140*** -0.120*** 0.260*** 27,400
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
With recalls 0.116*** -0.035*** 0.151*** 46,226
(0.016) (0.013) (0.020)
30 min driving distance to border 0.111*** -0.102*** 0.213*** 6,028
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Only tradable goods 0.129*** -0.121*** 0.250*** 11,362
(0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Propensity score matching 0.114*** -0.111*** 0.226*** 23,294
(0.016) (0.022) (0.020)
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies
for education, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work
experience in last 13 years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to
UI entry, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment
entry, dummy for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market
districts. For the propensity score matching we follow Blundell et al. (2004) and match on two propensity
scores to estimate the effects of the REBP. These propensity scores balance the distribution of observable
characteristics in the treated and non-treated regions before/after and during the REBP. We estimate the
propensity score with a probit model and use radius matching with a radius of 0.02. Significance levels: ***
= 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 7: Effects of REBP on unemployment entry for men in the age groups 50-54
and 55-57
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Full Pre 10/91 Pre 10/91 Full Pre 10/91 Pre 10/91
sample low tenure/wage sample low tenure/wage
excl. machinery excl. machinery
industry industry
REBP introduced 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.006*** 0.004** 0.002
(A0 × TR) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
REBP abolished -0.005*** -0.010***
(A1 × TR) (0.001) (0.002)
p-value of F -test 0.005 0.001
Mean TRs pre-REBP 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.021
R2 0.079 0.081 0.090 0.083 0.085 0.096
No. of observations 3,707,735 2,040,874 1,649,450 1,509,371 936,780 762,889
No. of individuals 291,095 206,024 181,019 193,299 125,595 109,663
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log wage, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39,
52 weeks), blue-collar status, work experience in last 13 years, years of service current job, number of days
receiving sick leave past two years, dummies for industry, age-in-year dummies, year-quarter dummies, and
dummies for labor market districts. F-test tests null hypothesis that the coefficients on REBP introduced
and REBP abolished are jointly equal to zero. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 8: Effects for unemployed entering before 10/1991
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Early Early Early Early Early
retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement retirement
with DI without DI with DI without DI
A. Inflow prior to 10/1991
During REBP 0.137*** 0.104*** 0.033*** 0.145*** -0.129*** 0.274***
(D × TR) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033)
Mean TRs pre-REBP 0.252 0.217 0.035 0.505 0.315 0.190
R2 0.188 0.165 0.080 0.281 0.151 0.358
No. of observations 28,528 28,528 28,528 12,040 12,040 12,040
B. tenure/wage below 90th percentile, excl. machinery industry
REBP introduced 0.112*** 0.079*** 0.033*** 0.139*** -0.115*** 0.254***
(D × TR) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032)
Mean TRs pre-REBP 0.229 0.201 0.028 0.456 0.297 0.159
R2 0.173 0.151 0.079 0.264 0.162 0.353
No. of observations 22,582 22,582 22,582 9,604 9,604 9,604
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
within labor market districts. Control variables: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies
for education, dummies for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work
experience in last 13 years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to
UI entry, dummies for previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment
entry, dummy for spells that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market
districts. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
44
Table 9: Effects on program costs and payroll taxes for unemployed men in the age
groups 50-54 and 55-57
UI UA DI Old-age Payroll Net
benefits benefits benefits benefits taxes expenditures
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (A+B+C+D-E)
A. Age 50-54
During REBP 9,227*** -1,405*** 1,035 -939 -5,190*** 13,109***
(D × TR) (697) (303) (1,742) (1,317) (899) (2,243)
Mean TRs pre-REBP 13,611 1,984 38,981 93,361 18,763 129,175
R2 0.278 0.210 0.159 0.251 0.215 0.241
No. of observations 42,899 42,899 42,899 42,899 42,899 42,899
B. Age 55-57
During REBP 13,019*** -1,759*** -11,653*** 7,029** -2,828*** 9,465***
(D × TR) (1,166) (315) (2,140) (2,831) (483) (2,676)
Mean TRs pre-REBP 11,152 1,189 32,063 126,619 6,997 164,025
R2 0.465 0.214 0.187 0.397 0.185 0.417
No. of observations 15,175 15,175 15,175 15,175 15,175 15,175
Notes: The variables UI benefits, UA benefits, DI benefits, and payroll taxes measure the total amount of
UI benefits received, UA benefits received, DI benefits received, and payroll taxes paid until age 65. The
variable old-age benefits measures the total amount of old-age benefits received until age 78 (the average
life-expectancy of men during that time period). All amounts are in 2014 Euros. We assume a real interest
rate of 2.5% to discount future payment streams. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within labor
market districts. Controls: log previous wage, dummies for marital status, dummies for education, dummies
for weeks of UI eligibility (20, 30, 39, 52 weeks), blue-collar status at last job, work experience in last 13
years, years of service in last job, number of days receiving sick leave benefits prior to UI entry, dummies for
previous industry, age-in-year dummies, dummies for year-month of unemployment entry, dummy for spells
that start within 30 weeks before REBP introduction, and dummies for labor market districts. Significance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Control regions (CRs)
Treated regions 1 (TR1s)
Treated regions 2 (TR2s)
Figure 1: Regional distribution of REBP eligibility
Age
Old-Age Pension
Special Income Support
Relaxed Disability Pension
with REBP
with REBP
50 51 54 55 58 59 60
Figure 2: Early retirement pathways for unemployed men with/without REBP-
eligibility
Notes: Gray arrows denote maximum duration of regular UI benefits without REBP (1 year) and black
arrows denote maximum duration of regular UI benefits with REBP (4 year). Unemployed men can retire
early with DI at age 54 without the REBP and age 51 with the REBP by claiming regular UI benefits
followed by a DI pension at age 55 (=early retirement with DI). Unemployed men can retire early without
DI at age 58 without the REBP and age 55 with the REBP by claiming regular UI benefits followed by
special income support at age 59 and an old-age pension at age 60 (=early retirement without DI).
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Figure 3: Transitions into early retirement (Panel A), early retirement with DI
(Panel B), and early retirement without DI (Panel C) by age in TRs and CRs
before, during, and after REBP.
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Figure 4: Trends in transitions into early retirement, early retirement with DI, and
early retirement without DI in TRs and CRs by year and age group
Notes: First vertical line denotes the date when the REBP was implemented. The second and the third
vertical line denote the dates when the REBP was abolished in TR1s and TR2s, respectively.
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Figure 5: Coefficients of the interactions (A0t × TRi) and (A1t × TRi) from esti-
mating equation (1) for each age separately
Notes: The dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval. Unemployed men aged 45-49 are not eligible
for the REBP; unemployed men aged 58-59 do not need the REBP to retire early.
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Figure 6: Coefficients of the interactions (djt × TRi) in equation (2) by age group
Notes: The dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval. First vertical line denotes the date when the
REBP was implemented. The second and the third vertical line denote the dates when the REBP was
abolished in TR1s and TR2s, respectively.
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Figure 7: Regional difference in quarterly unemployment inflow rate (% of employ-
ment) by age group.
Notes: First vertical line denotes the date when the REBP was implemented. The second and the third
vertical line denote the dates when the REBP was abolished in TR1s and TR2s, respectively.
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